Emotions and Process Rationality

Oded Na’aman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)531-546
Number of pages16
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume99
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Keywords

  • diachronic norms
  • fittingness
  • processes
  • rationality of emotions
  • reasons

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