Enriching the RIT framework

Kenneth W. Abbott, David Levi-Faur*, Duncan Snidal

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the diverse goals that intermediaries pursue; the importance of how, and by whom, intermediaries are selected; the pathologies, such as regulatory capture, that may result from intermediaries’ character, goals, and origins; and opportunities to mitigate these pathologies through regulatory design.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)280-288
Number of pages9
JournalAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Volume670
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, SAGE Publications Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Capture
  • Intermediaries
  • Networks
  • Public interest
  • Regulation
  • Regulatory design

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