TY - JOUR
T1 - Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
AU - Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
AU - RüBbelke, Dirk T.G.
AU - Sheshinski, Eytan
PY - 2010/10
Y1 - 2010/10
N2 - International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
AB - International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77957117647&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00796.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00796.x
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AN - SCOPUS:77957117647
SN - 0013-0427
VL - 77
SP - 775
EP - 784
JO - Economica
JF - Economica
IS - 308
ER -