Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 775-784 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Economica |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue number | 308 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2010 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
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SDG 13 Climate Action
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