Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies

Matthew O. Jackson*, Ilan Kremer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations


We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness condition is necessary for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. In settings where allocations are excludable, asymptotic envy-freeness is also sufficient for implementation, while in non-excludable settings it is not sufficient.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)185-198
Number of pages14
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number3
StatePublished - Nov 2007
Externally publishedYes


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