Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

Robert J. Aumann; A. Brandenburger

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41

Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

Robert J. Aumann, A. Brandenburger

Einstein Institute of Mathematics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

Game theoretic reasoning has been widely applied in economics in recent years. Undoubtedly, the most commonly used tool has been the strategic equilibrium of Nash (Ann Math 54:286–295, 1951), or one or another of its so-called “refinements.” Though much effort has gone into developing these refinements, relatively little attention has been paid to a more basic question: Why consider Nash equilibrium in the first place?

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Readings in Formal Epistemology: Sourcebook
Editors	Horacio Arló-Costa, Vincent F. Hendricks, Johan van Benthem
Place of Publication	Cham
Publisher	Springer International Publishing AG
Pages	863–894
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-20451-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41
State	Published - 2016

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10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41

1 Article

Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
Aumann, R. & Brandenburger, A., 1995, In: Econometrica. 63, 5, p. 1161-1180 20 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
498 Scopus citations

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Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

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Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

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