Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Abraham Neyman*, Sylvain Sorin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)201-210
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1998

Keywords

  • Repeated games of incomplete information
  • Stochastic games

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