TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information
T2 - The general symmetric case
AU - Neyman, Abraham
AU - Sorin, Sylvain
PY - 1998/7
Y1 - 1998/7
N2 - Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.
AB - Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.
KW - Repeated games of incomplete information
KW - Stochastic games
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0032357406&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s001820050066
DO - 10.1007/s001820050066
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AN - SCOPUS:0032357406
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 27
SP - 201
EP - 210
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
IS - 2
ER -