Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Abraham Neyman; Sylvain Sorin

doi:10.1007/s001820050066

Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Abraham Neyman^*
, Sylvain Sorin

^*Corresponding author for this work

Einstein Institute of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	201-210
Number of pages	10
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	27
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050066
State	Published - Jul 1998

Keywords

Repeated games of incomplete information
Stochastic games

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10.1007/s001820050066

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title = "Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case",

abstract = "Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.",

keywords = "Repeated games of incomplete information, Stochastic games",

author = "Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin",

year = "1998",

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KW - Repeated games of incomplete information

KW - Stochastic games

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Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

Abstract

Keywords

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