TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibrium strategies and the value of information in a two line queueing system with threshold jockeying
AU - Hassin, Refael
AU - Haviv, Moshe
PY - 1994
Y1 - 1994
N2 - We consider memoryless two-line system with threshold jockeying. Upon arrival each customer decides whether to purchase the information about which line is shorter, or randomly selects one of the lines. Since the decision of a customer is affected by the decision of the others, we are interested in Nash-equilibrium policies. Indeed, we show explicitly how to find these policies. We are also interested in the externalities imposed by an informed customer on the others. We derive an explicit expression for these externalities in the case that jockeying takes place as soon as the lines differ by three. Some of the results may seem to be counterintuitive. For example, when the threshold is three, the value of information may increase with the portion of informed customers.
AB - We consider memoryless two-line system with threshold jockeying. Upon arrival each customer decides whether to purchase the information about which line is shorter, or randomly selects one of the lines. Since the decision of a customer is affected by the decision of the others, we are interested in Nash-equilibrium policies. Indeed, we show explicitly how to find these policies. We are also interested in the externalities imposed by an informed customer on the others. We derive an explicit expression for these externalities in the case that jockeying takes place as soon as the lines differ by three. Some of the results may seem to be counterintuitive. For example, when the threshold is three, the value of information may increase with the portion of informed customers.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0002272105&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/15326349408807302
DO - 10.1080/15326349408807302
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AN - SCOPUS:0002272105
SN - 0882-0287
VL - 10
SP - 415
EP - 435
JO - Communications in Statistics. Part C: Stochastic Models
JF - Communications in Statistics. Part C: Stochastic Models
IS - 2
ER -