Equilibrium strategies for queues with impatient customers

Refael Hassin; Moshe Haviv

doi:10.1016/0167-6377(94)00049-C

Equilibrium strategies for queues with impatient customers

Refael Hassin^*, Moshe Haviv

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Statistics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a memoryless queue in which the reward of service completion for an individual reduces to zero after some time. Customers, while comparing expected holding costs and the rewards have to decide if to join the system at all and if they do when to renege. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which each of the customers joins with some probability and reneges as soon as the reward is zero.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	41-45
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	17
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(94)00049-C
State	Published - Feb 1995

Keywords

Balking and reneging
Nash equilibrium
Queues

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10.1016/0167-6377(94)00049-C

Cite this

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abstract = "We consider a memoryless queue in which the reward of service completion for an individual reduces to zero after some time. Customers, while comparing expected holding costs and the rewards have to decide if to join the system at all and if they do when to renege. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which each of the customers joins with some probability and reneges as soon as the reward is zero.",

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AB - We consider a memoryless queue in which the reward of service completion for an individual reduces to zero after some time. Customers, while comparing expected holding costs and the rewards have to decide if to join the system at all and if they do when to renege. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which each of the customers joins with some probability and reneges as soon as the reward is zero.

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Equilibrium strategies for queues with impatient customers

Abstract

Keywords

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