Evidence games: Truth and commitment

Sergiu Hart, Ilan Kremer, Motty Perry

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

42 Scopus citations


An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome. (JEL C72, D82, D83, K41).

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)690-713
Number of pages24
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Issue number3
StatePublished - Mar 2017

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
European Research Council (ERC). Kremer's research partially supported by a grant of the European Research Council (ERC).


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