Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

Sergiu Hart*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)227-264
Number of pages38
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume41
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2002

Keywords

  • Backward induction equilibrium
  • Evolutionary dynamics
  • Evolutionary stability
  • Games in extensive form
  • Games of perfect information
  • Mutation
  • Population games
  • Selection
  • Subgame-perfect equilibrium

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