Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

Sergiu Hart

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-X

Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

Sergiu Hart^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	227-264
Number of pages	38
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	41
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-X
State	Published - Nov 2002

Keywords

Backward induction equilibrium
Evolutionary dynamics
Evolutionary stability
Games in extensive form
Games of perfect information
Mutation
Population games
Selection
Subgame-perfect equilibrium

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10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-X

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title = "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction",

abstract = "The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.",

keywords = "Backward induction equilibrium, Evolutionary dynamics, Evolutionary stability, Games in extensive form, Games of perfect information, Mutation, Population games, Selection, Subgame-perfect equilibrium",

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KW - Backward induction equilibrium

KW - Evolutionary dynamics

KW - Evolutionary stability

KW - Games in extensive form

KW - Games of perfect information

KW - Mutation

KW - Population games

KW - Selection

KW - Subgame-perfect equilibrium

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Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

Abstract

Keywords

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