TY - JOUR
T1 - Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements
AU - Babaioff, Moshe
AU - Ezra, Tomer
AU - Feige, Uriel
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright: © 2023 INFORMS.
PY - 2024/11
Y1 - 2024/11
N2 - We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion for which, to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of the agent’s MMS. In this paper, we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new and satisfies APSPMMS, for which the inequality is sometimes strict. We present two equivalent definitions for the APS (one as a minimization problem, the other as a maximization problem) and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a 35 - fraction of the agent’s APS. This algorithm can also be viewed as providing strategies in a certain natural bidding game, and these strategies secure each agent at least a 35 - fraction of the agent’s APS.
AB - We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion for which, to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of the agent’s MMS. In this paper, we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new and satisfies APSPMMS, for which the inequality is sometimes strict. We present two equivalent definitions for the APS (one as a minimization problem, the other as a maximization problem) and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a 35 - fraction of the agent’s APS. This algorithm can also be viewed as providing strategies in a certain natural bidding game, and these strategies secure each agent at least a 35 - fraction of the agent’s APS.
KW - fair division
KW - indivisible goods
KW - maximin share
KW - unequal entitlements
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85210762061&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1287/moor.2021.0199
DO - 10.1287/moor.2021.0199
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AN - SCOPUS:85210762061
SN - 0364-765X
VL - 49
SP - 2180
EP - 2211
JO - Mathematics of Operations Research
JF - Mathematics of Operations Research
IS - 4
ER -