False consciousness for liberals, part I: Consent, autonomy, and adaptive preferences

David Enoch*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)159-210
Number of pages52
JournalThe Philosophical Review
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Natalie Stoljar has been extremely helpful both in introducing me to some of the relevant literature and in correspondence, when I tried some of my initial ideas on her. For discussions and comments on earlier versions I am grateful to Rachel Achs, Dani Attas, David Black, Lidal Dror, Jamie Dreier, Nir Eyal, Josh Guetzkow, Ronni Gura Sadovsky, Avi Kenan, Steven Lukes, Bar Luzon, Lije Millgram, Ittay Nissan-Rosen, Massimo Renzo, Mark Schroeder, Rosa Terlazzo, David Weberman, Preston Werner, Daniel Wodak, the editors and readers for the Philosophical Review, and audiences in Paris, Montreal, Jerusalem, Harvard, Oxford, Stanford, CEU, Dartmouth, and Berlin. This research is supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant number 439/15.

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