Financial disclosure and regulation

Moshe Levy*, Golan Benita, Haim Levy

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

A portfolio approach is used here to analyze the value of financial disclosure to stockholders and the need for disclosure regulation. This demonstrates that in a portfolio context the degree of public financial disclosure does not influence a firm's value. Hence, if disclosure is costly, firms have no incentive to disclose information voluntarily. Under partial disclosure, however, investors select inefficient portfolios, implying a substantial welfare loss; hence, we need regulation. The analysis provides a framework for determining optimal disclosure from the point of view of social welfare.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)107-115
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Portfolio Management
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006

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