Fixation in evolutionary games under non-vanishing selection

M. Mobilia*, M. Assaf

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

One of the most striking effect of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. Here, we generalize a recent WKB-based theory to study fixation in evolutionary games under non-vanishing selection, andinvestigate the relation between selection intensity w and demographic (random) fluctuations. This allows the accurate treatment of large fluctuations and yields the probability and mean times of fixation beyond the weak-selection limit. The power of the theory is demonstrated on prototypical models of cooperation dilemmas with multiple absorbing states. Our predictions compare excellently with numerical simulations and, for finite w, significantly improve over those of the Fokker-Planck approximation.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number10002
JournalLettere Al Nuovo Cimento
Volume91
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2010

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