TY - GEN
T1 - FLIPPING COINS IN MANY POCKETS (BYZANTINE AGREEMENT ON UNIFORMLY RANDOM VALUES).
AU - Broder, Andrei Z.
AU - Dolev, Danny
PY - 1984
Y1 - 1984
N2 - It was recently shown by M. O. Rabin (1983) that a sequence of random 0-1 values, prepared and distributed by a trusted 'dealer,' can be used to achieve Byzantine agreement in constant expected time in a network of processors. A natural question is whether it is possible to generate these values uniformly at random within the network. The authors present a cryptography-based protocol for agreement on a 0-1 random value, if less than half of the processors are faulty. In fact, the protocol allows uniform sampling from any finite set and thus solves the problem of choosing a network leader uniformly at random. The protocol is usable both when all the communication is via broadcast, in which case it needs three rounds of information exchange, and when each pair of processors communicate on a private line, in which case it needs 3t plus 3 rounds, where t is the number of faulty processors. The protocol remains valid even if passive eavesdropping is allowed. On the other hand, it is shown that no (probabilistic) protocol can achieve agreement on a fair coin in fewer phases than necessary for Byzantine agreement, and hence the 'predealt' nature of the random sequence required for Rabin's algorithm is crucial.
AB - It was recently shown by M. O. Rabin (1983) that a sequence of random 0-1 values, prepared and distributed by a trusted 'dealer,' can be used to achieve Byzantine agreement in constant expected time in a network of processors. A natural question is whether it is possible to generate these values uniformly at random within the network. The authors present a cryptography-based protocol for agreement on a 0-1 random value, if less than half of the processors are faulty. In fact, the protocol allows uniform sampling from any finite set and thus solves the problem of choosing a network leader uniformly at random. The protocol is usable both when all the communication is via broadcast, in which case it needs three rounds of information exchange, and when each pair of processors communicate on a private line, in which case it needs 3t plus 3 rounds, where t is the number of faulty processors. The protocol remains valid even if passive eavesdropping is allowed. On the other hand, it is shown that no (probabilistic) protocol can achieve agreement on a fair coin in fewer phases than necessary for Byzantine agreement, and hence the 'predealt' nature of the random sequence required for Rabin's algorithm is crucial.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0021557358&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:0021557358
SN - 081860591X
T3 - Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (Proceedings)
SP - 157
EP - 170
BT - Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (Proceedings)
PB - IEEE
ER -