Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

Jean François Mertens; Shmuel Zamir

doi:10.1007/BF01770224

Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

Jean François Mertens^*
, Shmuel Zamir

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

415 Scopus citations

Abstract

A formal model is given of Harsanyi's infinite hierarchies of beliefs. It is shown that the model closes with some Bayesian game with incomplete information, and that any such game can be approximated by one with a finite number of states of world.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-29
Number of pages	29
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	14
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770224
State	Published - Mar 1985

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title = "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information",

abstract = "A formal model is given of Harsanyi's infinite hierarchies of beliefs. It is shown that the model closes with some Bayesian game with incomplete information, and that any such game can be approximated by one with a finite number of states of world.",

author = "Mertens, \{Jean Fran{\c c}ois\} and Shmuel Zamir",

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Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

Abstract

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