Abstract
IP headers include a 16-bit ID field. Our work examines the generation of this field in Windows (versions 8 and higher), Linux and Android, and shows that the IP ID field enables remote servers to assign a unique ID to each device and thus be able to identify subsequent transmissions sent from that device. This identification works across all browsers and over network changes. In modern Linux and Android versions, this field leaks a kernel address, thus we also break KASLR. Our work includes reverse-engineering of the Windows IP ID generation code, and a cryptanalysis of this code and of the Linux kernel IP ID generation code. It provides practical techniques to partially extract the key used by each of these algorithms, overcoming different implementation issues, and observing that this key can identify individual devices. We deployed a demo (for Windows) showing that key extraction and machine fingerprinting works in the wild, and tested it from networks around the world.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium |
Publisher | USENIX Association |
Pages | 1063-1080 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781939133069 |
State | Published - 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 28th USENIX Security Symposium - Santa Clara, United States Duration: 14 Aug 2019 → 16 Aug 2019 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium |
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Conference
Conference | 28th USENIX Security Symposium |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Santa Clara |
Period | 14/08/19 → 16/08/19 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019 by The USENIX Association. All rights reserved.