This article proposes to narrow the gap between the space of reasons and the space of causes. By articulating the standard phenomenology of reasons and causes, we investigate the cases in which the clear-cut divide between reasons and causes starts to break down. Thus, substituting the simple picture of the relationship between the space of reasons and the space of causes with an inverted and complex one, in which reasons can have a causal-like phenomenology and causes can have a reason-like phenomenology. This is attained by focusing on "swift reasoned actions"on the one hand, and on "causal noisy brain mechanisms"on the other hand. In the final part of the article, I show how an analogous move, that of narrowing the gap between one's normative framework and the space of reasons, can be seen as an extension of narrowing the gap between the space of causes and the space of reasons.
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2020 Ariel Furstenberg, published by De Gruyter 2020.
- neuronal noise
- neuroscience and philosophy