Fuzzy legality and national styles of regulation: Government intervention in the israel downstream oil market

Margit Cohn*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article examines the role of statute law in regulation and government intervention through a detailed historical case study of a crucial retail market. The history of state intervention in the Israeli oil supply market is dominated by “fuzzy legality,” a concept expounded in a former article. Legal fuzziness allowed the industry, acting in concert with the government regulator, to retain a lucrative, practically non–accountable arrangement in changing politico–economic climates. Three central forces encouraged continuing fuzziness: a “cloud” of state security, institutional stickiness that preserved colonial mandatory legal structures, and a prevalent national culture of nonlegalism. The article ends with a careful suggestion regarding the Israeli national style of regulation. Compared to American “adversarial legalism,” and its opposite, “consensual nonlegalism” the Israeli style may be termed “adversarial nonlegalism,” and holds less promise for balancing market and public interests. Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)51-88
Number of pages38
JournalLaw and Policy
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2002

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