Game theory

"Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers."--taken from back cover.
Contents: Acknowledgments -- Notations -- Introduction -- 1. The game of chess -- 2. Utility theory -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Strategic-form games -- 5. Mixed strategies -- 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem -- 7. Equilibrium refinements -- 8. Correlated equilibria -- 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors -- 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model -- 11. The universal belief space -- 12. Auctions -- 13. Repeated games -- 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs -- 15. Bargaining games -- 16. Coalitional games with transferable utility -- 17. The core -- 18. The Shapley value -- 19. The bargaining set -- 20. The nucleolus -- 21. Social choice -- 22. Stable matching -- 23. Appendices -- Index