Grassroots fiscal centralization: subnational delegation of revenue authority in Argentina

The concept of delegation offers scholars of federalism a novel analytical framework for examining previously overlooked aspects of fiscal centralization. Adopting a bottom-up approach, we develop a taxonomy of delegation types to assess the dynamic evolution and feedback effects of key milestones of fiscal centralization in Argentina, a developing federation with institutionally strong provinces that have increasingly surrendered revenue authority. We conceptualize fiscal centralization as a cyclical economic adjustment, wherein provinces delegated tax and borrowing powers following major economic disruptions–specifically, the Great Depression and Argentina’s sovereign debt default. In contrast, during periods of economic growth that promised increased subnational fiscal revenues, provinces further relinquished tax authority as a procyclical correction. Overall, this analysis demonstrates how categorizing delegation into distinct types can enrich the literature on the distribution of fiscal power–a central dimension of subnational self-rule in federal systems.