Harsanyi values of large economies: Nonequivalence to competitive equilibria

Sergiu Hart*, Andreu Mas-Colell

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resulting coalitional games. In particular, we provide a (smooth and robust) example where the "value principle" does not hold for the Harsanyi NTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium, which however does not belong to the (nonempty) set of Harsanyi value allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)74-99
Number of pages26
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume13
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1996

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