TY - JOUR
T1 - Harsanyi values of large economies
T2 - Nonequivalence to competitive equilibria
AU - Hart, Sergiu
AU - Mas-Colell, Andreu
PY - 1996/3
Y1 - 1996/3
N2 - We consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resulting coalitional games. In particular, we provide a (smooth and robust) example where the "value principle" does not hold for the Harsanyi NTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium, which however does not belong to the (nonempty) set of Harsanyi value allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.
AB - We consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resulting coalitional games. In particular, we provide a (smooth and robust) example where the "value principle" does not hold for the Harsanyi NTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium, which however does not belong to the (nonempty) set of Harsanyi value allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0030096967&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/game.1996.0025
DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0025
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AN - SCOPUS:0030096967
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 13
SP - 74
EP - 99
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -