Abstract
We consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resulting coalitional games. In particular, we provide a (smooth and robust) example where the "value principle" does not hold for the Harsanyi NTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium, which however does not belong to the (nonempty) set of Harsanyi value allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 74-99 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1996 |
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