Abstract
The article considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being - as a fundamental, first-order value - and (distributive) fairness - as a high-order value whose exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters - individual well-being - and when it matters - in interpersonal conflicts in which constitutive aspects of individual well-being clash. Consequently, the proposed theory is not exposed to the claim that fairness comes at the expense of welfare. This theory is considered within a consequential framework, based on the standard version and, alternatively, on a novel interpretation of consequentialism. Thus, it refutes the claim that consequentialism does not take the distinction between persons seriously.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 309-330 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Utilitas |
Volume | 22 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2010 |