Honest verifier vs dishonest verifier in public coin zero-knowledge proofs

Ivan Damgård, Oded Goldreich, Tatsuaki Okamoto, Avi Wigderson

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents two transformations of public-coin/Arthur-Merlin proof systems which are zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier into (public-coin/Arthur-Merlin) proof systems which are zero-knowledge with respect to any verifier. The first transformation applies only to constant-round proof systems. It builds on Damgård’s transformation (see Crypto93), using ordinary hashing functions instead of the interactive hashing protocol (of Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung — see Crypto92) which was used by Damgård. Consequently, the protocols resulting from our transformation have much lower round-complexity than those derived by Damgård’s transformation. As in Damgård’s transformation, our transformation preserves statistical/perfect zero-knowledge and does not rely on any computational assumptions. However, unlike Damgård’s transformation, the new transformation is not applicable to argument systems or to proofs of knowledge. The second transformation can be applied to proof systems of arbitrary number of rounds, but it only preserves statistical zero-knowledge. It assumes the existence of secure commitment schemes and transforms any public-coin proof which is statistical zero-knowledge with respect to the honest into one which is statistical zero-knowledge (in general). It follows, by a result of Ostrovsky and Wigderson (1993), that any language which is “hard on the average” and has a public-coin proof system which is statistical zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier, has a proof system which is statistical zero-knowledge (with respect to any verifier).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology ― CRYPTO 1995 - 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
EditorsDon Coppersmith
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages325-338
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)3540602216, 9783540602217
DOIs
StatePublished - 1995
Event15th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 19995 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 27 Aug 199531 Aug 1995

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume963
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference15th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 19995
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period27/08/9531/08/95

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995.

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