How are basic belief-forming methods justified?

David Enoch*, Joshua Schechter

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

49 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief-forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought, and address objections to it. We conclude by commenting on the implications that our account may have for other important epistemological debates.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)547-579
Number of pages33
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume76
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2008

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'How are basic belief-forming methods justified?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this