A major limitation of many blockchain systems is the lack of strong identities in the underlying P2P network. This allows any nodes to attack the system by creating multiple false personas, thereby disrupting the network's connectivity and sabotaging its operation. In this paper, we focus on P2P networks, and explore practical ways to defend them from such attacks. To do so, we employ a game theoretic approach to the management of each peer's list of known nodes and to the overlay construction mechanisms that utilize this list. We consider the interaction between the defender and attacker as a game. We show that the cost of attacks can be driven up substantially if the defender utilizes available information about peers it chooses to connect to, such as their IP address. In addition to theoretical analysis of the underlying game, we apply our approach to the Bitcoin P2P network and derive effective and practical strategies that guarantee a high safety level against attacks.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||AFT 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies|
|Publisher||Association for Computing Machinery, Inc|
|Number of pages||9|
|State||Published - 21 Oct 2020|
|Event||2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT 2020 - Virtual, Online, United States|
Duration: 21 Oct 2020 → 23 Oct 2020
|Name||AFT 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies|
|Conference||2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT 2020|
|Period||21/10/20 → 23/10/20|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant 1504/17) and by a grant from the HUJI Cyber Security Research Center in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau.
© 2020 ACM.
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