Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological

Aaron Segal*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Classic inductive skepticism–the epistemological claim that we have no good reason to believe that the unobserved resembles the observed–is plausibly everyone’s lot, whether or not they embrace Hume’s metaphysical claim that distinct existents are “entirely loose and separate”. But contemporary advocates of a Humean metaphysic accept a metaphysical claim stronger than Hume’s own. I argue that their view plausibly gives rise to a radical inductive skepticism–according to which we are downright irrational in believing as we do about the unobserved–that we don’t otherwise have reason to accept. The Metaphysical Neo-Humean is in an epistemological quagmire all her own.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)905-925
Number of pages21
JournalSynthese
Volume199
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature B.V.

Keywords

  • Denial of necessary connections
  • Epistemological humeanism
  • Metaphysical humeanism
  • Problem of induction

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