Abstract
Hypothetical consent is puzzling.Onthe one hand, it seems tomake amoral difference across a wide range of cases. On the other hand, there seem to be principled reasons to think that it cannot. In this article I put forward reasonably precise formulations of these general suspicions regarding hypothetical consent; I draw several distinctions regarding the ways in which hypothetical consent may make a moral difference; I distinguish between two autonomy-related concerns, nonalienation and sovereignty; and, utilizing these distinctions, I show that-and in a preliminary way, when-the objections to the moral significance of hypothetical consent fail.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 6-36 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Ethics |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2017 |
Bibliographical note
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