Impersonation-based mechanisms

Moshe Babaioff*, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we present a general scheme to create mechanisms that approximate the social welfare in the presence of selfish (but rational) behavior of agents. The usual approach is to design truthful mechanisms in which an agent can only lose by impersonating as another agent. In contrast, our approach is to allow an agent to impersonate several different agents. We design the mechanisms such that only a limited set of impersonations are reasonable to rational agents. Our mechanisms make sure that for any choice of such impersonations by the agents, an approximation to the social welfare is achieved. We demonstrate our results on the well studied domain of Combinatorial Auctions (CA). Our mechanisms are algorithmic implementations, a notion recently suggested in (Babaioff, Lavi, & Pavlov 2006).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 18th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-06/IAAI-06
Pages592-597
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes
Event21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 18th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-06/IAAI-06 - Boston, MA, United States
Duration: 16 Jul 200620 Jul 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume1

Conference

Conference21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 18th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-06/IAAI-06
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBoston, MA
Period16/07/0620/07/06

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