Abstract
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play communication. Previous work has considered this problem in a synchronous setting. Here we consider the effect of asynchrony on the problem, and provide upper bounds for implementing mediators. Considering asynchronous environments introduces new subtleties, including exactly what solution concept is most appropriate and determining what move is played if the cheap talk goes on forever. Different results are obtained depending on whether the move after such "infinite play'' is under the control of the players or part of the description of the game.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | PODC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
Pages | 501-510 |
Number of pages | 10 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450362177 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 16 Jul 2019 |
Event | 38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2019 - Toronto, Canada Duration: 29 Jul 2019 → 2 Aug 2019 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing |
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Conference
Conference | 38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2019 |
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Country/Territory | Canada |
City | Toronto |
Period | 29/07/19 → 2/08/19 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019 ACM.
Keywords
- Distributed computing
- Game theory
- Security