Implementing mediators with asynchronous cheap talk

Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Ivan Geffner, Joseph Y. Halpern

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play communication. Previous work has considered this problem in a synchronous setting. Here we consider the effect of asynchrony on the problem, and provide upper bounds for implementing mediators. Considering asynchronous environments introduces new subtleties, including exactly what solution concept is most appropriate and determining what move is played if the cheap talk goes on forever. Different results are obtained depending on whether the move after such "infinite play'' is under the control of the players or part of the description of the game.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPODC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages501-510
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781450362177
DOIs
StatePublished - 16 Jul 2019
Event38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2019 - Toronto, Canada
Duration: 29 Jul 20192 Aug 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

Conference

Conference38th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2019
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityToronto
Period29/07/192/08/19

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 ACM.

Keywords

  • Distributed computing
  • Game theory
  • Security

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