@inproceedings{81aa9d86da3248f2a82b2d292456f566,
title = "Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms",
abstract = "Running several sub-optimal algorithms and choosing-the optimal one is a common procedure in computer science, most notably in the design of approximation algorithms. This paper deals with one significant flaw of this technique in environments where the inputs are provided by rational agents: such protocols are not necessarily incentive compatible even when the underlying algorithms are. We characterize sufficient and necessary conditions for such best-outcome protocols to be incentive compatible in a general model for agents with one-dimensional private data. We show how our techniques apply in several settings.",
keywords = "Dominant strategies, Mechanism design, Single parameter",
author = "Liad Blumrosen",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.1145/1329125.1329224",
language = "אנגלית",
isbn = "9788190426275",
series = "Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents",
pages = "547--549",
booktitle = "AAMAS'07 - Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
note = "6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS'07 ; Conference date: 14-05-2008 Through 18-05-2008",
}