Implementing the maximum of monotone algorithms

Liad Blumrosen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Running several sub-optimal algorithms and choosing the optimal one is a common procedure in computer science, most notably in the design of approximation algorithms. This paper deals with one significant flaw of this technique in environments where the inputs are provided by selfish agents: such protocols are not necessarily incentive compatible even when the underlying algorithms are. We characterize sufficient and necessary conditions for such best-outcome protocols to be incentive compatible in a general model for agents with one-dimensional private data. We show how our techniques apply in several settings.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAAI-07/IAAI-07 Proceedings
Subtitle of host publication22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 19th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference
Pages30-35
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
EventAAAI-07/IAAI-07 Proceedings: 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 19th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: 22 Jul 200726 Jul 2007

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume1

Conference

ConferenceAAAI-07/IAAI-07 Proceedings: 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 19th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period22/07/0726/07/07

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