Inapproximability of combinatorial public projects

Michael Schapira*, Yaron Singer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

12 Scopus citations


We study the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP) in which n agents are assigned a subset of m resources of size k so as to maximize the social welfare. Combinatorial public projects are an abstraction of many resource-assignment problems (Internet-related network design, elections, etc.). It is known that if all agents have submodular valuations then a constant approximation is achievable in polynomial time. However, submodularity is a strong assumption that does not always hold in practice. We show that (unlike similar problems such as combinatorial auctions) even slight relaxations of the submodularity assumption result in non-constant lower bounds for approximation.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 4th International Workshop, WINE 2008, Proceedings
Number of pages11
StatePublished - 2008
Event4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 17 Dec 200820 Dec 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5385 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008


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