Incentive-compatible distributed greedy protocols

Noam Nisan*, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, i.e., to repeatedly "best respond" to the others' actions. We present recent work (Proc. ICS'11) where we tackle the following general question: "When is it best for a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol?". We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of games where greedy behavior (i.e., repeated best-response) is incentive compatible for all players. We identify several environments of interest that fall within this class, thus establishing the incentive compatibility of the natural distributed greedy protocol for each. These environments include models of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4], which handles routing on the Internet, and of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [3], and also stable-roommates assignments [2] and cost-sharing [5], which have been extensively studied in economic theory.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationPODC'11 - Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium Principles of Distributed Computing
Pages335-336
Number of pages2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event30th Annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC'11, Held as Part of the 5th Federated Computing Research Conference, FCRC - San Jose, CA, United States
Duration: 6 Jun 20118 Jun 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

Conference

Conference30th Annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC'11, Held as Part of the 5th Federated Computing Research Conference, FCRC
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Jose, CA
Period6/06/118/06/11

Keywords

  • game theory
  • greedy protocols

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Incentive-compatible distributed greedy protocols'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this