TY - GEN
T1 - Incentive-compatible distributed greedy protocols
AU - Nisan, Noam
AU - Schapira, Michael
AU - Valiant, Gregory
AU - Zohar, Aviv
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, i.e., to repeatedly "best respond" to the others' actions. We present recent work (Proc. ICS'11) where we tackle the following general question: "When is it best for a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol?". We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of games where greedy behavior (i.e., repeated best-response) is incentive compatible for all players. We identify several environments of interest that fall within this class, thus establishing the incentive compatibility of the natural distributed greedy protocol for each. These environments include models of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4], which handles routing on the Internet, and of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [3], and also stable-roommates assignments [2] and cost-sharing [5], which have been extensively studied in economic theory.
AB - Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, i.e., to repeatedly "best respond" to the others' actions. We present recent work (Proc. ICS'11) where we tackle the following general question: "When is it best for a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol?". We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of games where greedy behavior (i.e., repeated best-response) is incentive compatible for all players. We identify several environments of interest that fall within this class, thus establishing the incentive compatibility of the natural distributed greedy protocol for each. These environments include models of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4], which handles routing on the Internet, and of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [3], and also stable-roommates assignments [2] and cost-sharing [5], which have been extensively studied in economic theory.
KW - game theory
KW - greedy protocols
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79959892995&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1993806.1993871
DO - 10.1145/1993806.1993871
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???
AN - SCOPUS:79959892995
SN - 9781450307192
T3 - Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
SP - 335
EP - 336
BT - PODC'11 - Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium Principles of Distributed Computing
T2 - 30th Annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC'11, Held as Part of the 5th Federated Computing Research Conference, FCRC
Y2 - 6 June 2011 through 8 June 2011
ER -