Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions

Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Noam Nisan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

146 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper deals with multi-unit combinatorial auctions where there are n types of goods for sale, and for each good there is some fixed number of units. We focus on the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. In particular, this includes the case where each good has exactly k units, and each bidder desires no more than a single unit of each good. We provide incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions for the general case where bidders are not limited to single minded valuations. The mechanisms we give have approximation ratios close to the best possible for both on-line and off-line scenarios. This is the first result where non-VCG mechanisms are derived for non-single minded bidders for a natural model of combinatorial auctions.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003
EditorsMoshe Tennenholtz
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages72-87
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)1581137311, 9781581137316
DOIs
StatePublished - 20 Jun 2003
Event9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003 - Bloomington, United States
Duration: 20 Jun 200322 Jun 2003

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003

Conference

Conference9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBloomington
Period20/06/0322/06/03

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