Incentive compatible two player cake cutting

Avishay Maya*, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

29 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Proceedings
Pages170-183
Number of pages14
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012 - Liverpool, United Kingdom
Duration: 10 Dec 201212 Dec 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7695 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLiverpool
Period10/12/1212/12/12

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