TY - GEN
T1 - Incentive compatible two player cake cutting
AU - Maya, Avishay
AU - Nisan, Noam
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.
AB - We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84871360819&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_13
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_13
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AN - SCOPUS:84871360819
SN - 9783642353109
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 170
EP - 183
BT - Internet and Network Economics - 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Proceedings
T2 - 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012
Y2 - 10 December 2012 through 12 December 2012
ER -