Institutional investors as minority shareholders

Assaf Hamdani*, Yishay Yafeh

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

39 Scopus citations


We examine the link between minority shareholders' rights and corporate governance by studying institutional investors' voting patterns in a concentrated ownership environment. Institutions rarely vote against insider-sponsored proposals even when the law empowers the minority. Institutions vote against compensation-related proposals more often than against related party transactions even when minority shareholders cannot influence outcomes. Potentially conflicted institutions are more likely to vote for insiders' proposals than stand-alone investors, regardless of their effect on outcomes. A plausible conclusion is that empowering minority shareholders affects the selection of proposals but not actual voting; another is that empowering minority shareholders is ineffective without addressing conflicts of interest.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)691-725
Number of pages35
JournalReview of Finance
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2013


Dive into the research topics of 'Institutional investors as minority shareholders'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this