Internet resiliency to attacks and failures under BGP policy routing

Danny Dolev, Sugih Jamin, Osnat (Ossi) Mokryn*, Yuval Shavitt

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

43 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate the resiliency of the Internet at the Autonomous System (AS) level to failures and attacks, under the real constraint of business agreements between the ASs. The agreements impose policies that govern routing in the AS level, and thus the resulting topology graph is directed, and thus the reachability between Ases is not transitive. We show, using partial views obtained from the Internet, that the Internet's resiliency to a deliberate attack is much smaller than previously found, and its reachability is also somewhat lower under random failures. We use different metrics to measure resiliency, and also investigate the effect of added backup connectivity on the resiliency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3183-3196
Number of pages14
JournalComputer Networks
Volume50
Issue number16
DOIs
StatePublished - 14 Nov 2006

Keywords

  • AS relationships
  • Directed graph
  • Valley free routing

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