Intra-Party Determinants of Coalition Bargaining

Moshe Maor*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

Analyses of the impact of intra-party conflicts on coalition bargaining have generally concluded that, when intra-party conflicts occur, the more centralized the party structure, the more effective is the party as a coalition actor. This paper argues a concrete alternative which challenges the traditional view. It suggests that, when intra-party conflicts occur, organizational decentralization allows the party to handle conflicts in a variety of manageable ways without forcing members to leave the party. As a result, the party can enter into conflict-inducing coalition negotiations with other parties without risking its hold on its own members. A centralized organization, however, lacks the mechanisms necessary to adjust to dissent among its members and is therefore at a disadvantage when it enters parliamentary negotiations. This argument is strongly supported by a comparative analysis of intra-party conflicts and coalition governments in Denmark, Norway, Italy, France and the UK.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)65-91
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1995
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • bargaining power
  • conflict manifestation
  • conflict resolution
  • intra-party conflicts
  • legislative strategy

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