Abstract
This chapter compares general jurisprudence to metaethics, showing how the former is not interesting in the ways the latter is. A major part of what makes metaethics interesting is the full-blooded normativity of morality. The law, however, is not full-bloodedly normative. And while it is formally normative—it generates criteria of correctness—this is not remotely enough to render jurisprudence interesting. The chapter also notes that response-dependence—a highly controversial view in metaethics—is the obvious way to go in jurisprudence, and that general jurisprudential issues are unlikely to have implications for normative legal theory.
Original language | American English |
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Title of host publication | Dimensions of Normativity |
Subtitle of host publication | New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 65-86 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISBN (Print) | 978019064040 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2019 |