Is ML-Based Cryptanalysis Inherently Limited? Simulating Cryptographic Adversaries via Gradient-Based Methods

Avital Shafran*, Eran Malach, Thomas Ristenpart, Gil Segev, Stefano Tessaro

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Given the recent progress in machine learning (ML), the cryptography community has started exploring the applicability of ML methods to the design of new cryptanalytic approaches. While current empirical results show promise, the extent to which such methods may outperform classical cryptanalytic approaches is still somewhat unclear. In this work, we initiate exploration of the theory of ML-based cryptanalytic techniques, in particular providing new results towards understanding whether they are fundamentally limited compared to traditional approaches. Whereas most classic cryptanalysis crucially relies on directly processing individual samples (e.g., plaintext-ciphertext pairs), modern ML methods thus far only interact with samples via gradient-based computations that average a loss function over all samples. It is, therefore, conceivable that such gradient-based methods are inherently weaker than classical approaches. We introduce a unifying framework for capturing both “sample-based” adversaries that are provided with direct access to individual samples and “gradient-based” ones that are restricted to issuing gradient-based queries that are averaged over all given samples via a loss function. Within our framework, we establish a general feasibility result showing that any sample-based adversary can be simulated by a seemingly-weaker gradient-based one. Moreover, the simulation exhibits a nearly optimal overhead in terms of the gradient-based simulator’s running time. Finally, we extend and refine our simulation technique to construct a gradient-based simulator that is fully parallelizable (crucial for avoiding an undesirable overhead for parallelizable cryptanalytic tasks), which is then used to construct a gradient-based simulator that executes the particular and highly useful gradient-descent method. Taken together, although the extent to which ML methods may outperform classical cryptanalytic approaches is still somewhat unclear, our results indicate that such gradient-based methods are not inherently limited by their seemingly restricted access to the provided samples.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2024 - 44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
EditorsLeonid Reyzin, Douglas Stebila
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages37-71
Number of pages35
ISBN (Print)9783031683909
StatePublished - 2024
Event44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2024 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 18 Aug 202422 Aug 2024

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume14925 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference44th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2024
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara
Period18/08/2422/08/24

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2024.

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