Jeffrey conditionalization, the principal principle, the desire as belief thesis, and adams's thesis

Ittay Nissan-Rozen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

I show that David Lewis's principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis's reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams's thesis applies also to his own principal principle.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)837-850
Number of pages14
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume64
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2013

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