Jeffrey conditionalization, the principal principle, the desire as belief thesis, and adams's thesis

Ittay Nissan-Rozen

doi:10.1093/bjps/axs039

Jeffrey conditionalization, the principal principle, the desire as belief thesis, and adams's thesis

Ittay Nissan-Rozen^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

I show that David Lewis's principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis's reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams's thesis applies also to his own principal principle.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	837-850
Number of pages	14
Journal	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume	64
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs039
State	Published - Dec 2013

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abstract = "I show that David Lewis's principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis's reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams's thesis applies also to his own principal principle.",

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Jeffrey conditionalization, the principal principle, the desire as belief thesis, and adams's thesis

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