Abstract
This article analyzes labor supervision activities reported in a survey of rice farmers in the Bicol region of the Philippines. We present a theoretical model that relates supervision intensity to institutional conditions. We estimate a supervision intensity equation and control for the decision to hire labor, the decision to supervise hired labor, and the type of the labor contract. The empirical estimates use different village-level spatial and demographic indicators as proxies for institutional conditions. The results are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model that supervision increases with weaker institutional conditions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 851-865 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | American Journal of Agricultural Economics |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 2006 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Financial support for this project was provided by the Economic Growth Center of Yale University. A previous version appeared as Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 814, Yale University, April 2000. The authors wish to thank Avi Simhon, Duncan Thomas, and participants at the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society 2000 and Northeast Universities Development Economics Conference 2000 for valuable comments and suggestions. The research assistance of Boriana Handjiyska is gratefully acknowledged.
Keywords
- Institutional conditions
- Labor supervision
- Philippine rice farmers
- Selectivity correction
- Time allocation
- Transaction costs
