Large shareholders and banks: Who monitors and how?

Yishay Yafeh*, Oved Yosha

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

96 Scopus citations

Abstract

Using a sample of Japanese firms in the chemical industry, we show that concentrated share-holding is associated with lower expenditure on activities with scope for managerial private benefits. We interpret this as evidence of a hitherto undocumented form of monitoring by large shareholders. We examine whether such monitoring is also performed by banks and other creditors. The results in the metal product industry are roughly similar, but we find no evidence of this type of monitoring in the Japanese electronics industry, and suggest a number of explanations.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)128-146
Number of pages19
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume113
Issue number484
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2003

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