TY - GEN
T1 - Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
AU - Dobzinski, Shahar
AU - Nisan, Noam
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - We consider computationally-efficient incentive-compatiblemechanisms that use the VCG payment scheme, and study how well theycan approximate the social welfare in auction settings. We present anovel technique for setting lower bounds on the approximation ratioof this type of mechanisms. Specifically, for combinatorial auctionsamong submodular (and thus also subadditive) bidders we prove an (m1/6) lower bound, which is close to the knownupper bound of O(m1/2), and qualitatively higher than theconstant factor approximation possible from a purely computationalpoint of view.
AB - We consider computationally-efficient incentive-compatiblemechanisms that use the VCG payment scheme, and study how well theycan approximate the social welfare in auction settings. We present anovel technique for setting lower bounds on the approximation ratioof this type of mechanisms. Specifically, for combinatorial auctionsamong submodular (and thus also subadditive) bidders we prove an (m1/6) lower bound, which is close to the knownupper bound of O(m1/2), and qualitatively higher than theconstant factor approximation possible from a purely computationalpoint of view.
KW - Combinatorial auctions
KW - Incentive compatibility
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=35448999665&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1250790.1250842
DO - 10.1145/1250790.1250842
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AN - SCOPUS:35448999665
SN - 1595936319
SN - 9781595936318
T3 - Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
SP - 338
EP - 344
BT - STOC'07
T2 - STOC'07: 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
Y2 - 11 June 2007 through 13 June 2007
ER -